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Abstract 
Planners, officials, and neighborhood groups often debate zoning changes, yet there is 
little empirical evidence explaining why zoning and other land use regulations are changed. I use 
logistic regression models to examine density-enabling rezoning (“upzoning”) in Los Angeles. I 
find that upzoning occurs where there are development opportunities combined with limited 
political resistance. Upzoning is most likely on well-located parcels zoned for low-intensity, non-
residential uses. Meanwhile, homeowners – and particularly homeowners with access to valuable 
amenities – are associated with regulatory stasis. I conclude by recommending strategies for 
addressing homeowners’ concerns about higher density housing. 
 
Keywords 
housing, land use, neighborhood planning, real estate, zoning 
 
Author biographical sketch 
C.J. Gabbe is an assistant professor in Santa Clara University’s Department of 
Environmental Studies and Sciences. His research focuses on the political economy of zoning, 
and the effects of land use regulations on housing markets. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Randy Crane, Michael Lens, Paavo Monkkonen, Marlon Boarnet, and 
three anonymous reviewers for their detailed and thoughtful feedback on this paper. All errors 
are my own. 
 3 
 
Funding 
This research was generously funded by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes 
Foundation Haynes Lindley Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship; the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy C. Lowell Harriss Dissertation Fellowship; and the UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship. 
 
  
 4 
Introduction 
Urban economists and planners have made strong arguments for easing residential 
density limits based on housing price (Fischel 2005a; Glaeser and Gyourko 2002), environmental 
(Calthorpe and Fulton 2001), equity (Pendall 2000), and consumer choice (Levine 2006) 
rationales. “Upzoning” is a common colloquial term used to describe land use regulatory changes 
that allow higher development intensity. While planners, politicians, and neighborhood groups 
often discuss upzoning, its actual occurrence is more rare. New York City, during a period of 
“rapid” rezoning activity, upzoned about 5% of its lots between 2003 and 2009 (Been, Madar, 
and McDonnell 2014). Los Angeles, by contrast, upzoned about 1.1% of its land area between 
2002 and 2014 (Gabbe 2016). This paper uses the case of Los Angeles to extend our limited 
empirical understanding of the determinants of municipal zoning change.  
I conceptualize the upzoning of a specific parcel to be a function of housing demand 
factors, existing supply constraints, the influence of interest groups, local demographic and 
economic factors, neighborhood trends, and municipal policy drivers. I first create a parcel 
dataset with Los Angeles regulatory, site, and neighborhood characteristics between 2002 and 
2014. I then specify logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between parcel 
upzoning and the potential determinants mentioned above.  
I find that upzoning follows the path of development opportunity combined with least 
political resistance, and there is strong evidence of homeowners’ influence. Specifically, 
upzoning is least likely in areas with concentrations of homeowners coupled with desirable 
amenities like proximity to the beach and high-performing schools. Upzoning is most likely for 
parcels zoned for low-intensity land uses, and in neighborhoods with rising rents. All else equal, 
there are no significant associations between demographic variables and upzoning. 
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The determinants of zoning changes 
Zoning codes emerged in the early twentieth century to separate single-family residences 
from industrial land uses, commercial areas, and apartments (Fischel 2004; Hirt 2007). Today, 
zoning codes typically prescribe what land uses are allowed by-right and as conditional uses, and 
the maximum development densities that are permitted (Hirt 2007; Hoch, Dalton, and So 2000). 
Changes to the zoning designation of a property must be approved by the municipal government, 
and can be initiated by either a property owner or the local government (Hoch, Dalton, and So 
2000). Below I assess what we know about the determinants of zoning change. 
 
Accessibility, amenities, and supply constraints 
Demand and supply factors drive how much housing is built and where. Housing demand 
within a metropolitan area is influenced by natural amenities and human-created locational 
advantages (Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998; DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996). Examples of natural 
amenities include proximity to the ocean or a location with a view. Human-created locational 
advantages include accessibility to employment and cultural amenities (DiPasquale and Wheaton 
1996).  
Supply constraints may be natural or human-made (Saiz 2010). Natural features that 
constrain housing supply include water bodies, mountains, and wetlands (DiPasquale and 
Wheaton 1996; Saiz 2010). Some natural constraints may also have an amenity effect, if a parcel 
on a steep slope (a constraint) also has a view (an amenity). Land use regulations constrain 
housing supply by limiting locations and densities of new development, adding standards for lots 
and buildings, and shifting costs from a municipality to a developer (Deakin 1989). Lot size can 
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also be a constraint since small lots – particularly lots smaller than 5,000 square feet – are more 
difficult to develop or redevelop (Landis et al. 2006). 
 
Interest groups 
Regulation is a product of competing interests seeking to rationally forward their self-
interest, and this competition plays out through the political process (Posner 1974; Stigler 1971). 
A handful of powerful interests are most active in proposing and influencing land use decisions, 
particularly the real estate development industry (Babcock 1966; Fischel 2005a; Logan and 
Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976; Stigler 1971; Warner and Molotch 2000), business associations 
(Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts 2005; Heberlig, Leland, and Read 2014), neighborhood 
organizations (Babcock 1966; Fischel 2005a; Frieden 1979; Warner and Molotch 2000), and 
environmental groups (Frieden 1979; Fulton 2001). Interest groups use votes and/or campaign 
contributions to influence politicians (Downs 1957; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005; Logan 
and Molotch 1987; Purcell 2000; Schone, Koch, and Baumont 2011). Homeowners, 
environmental groups, and owners of developed land are generalized as opposing growth, while 
owners of vacant land and the real estate development industry are viewed as pro-growth.  
Scholars have operationalized competition between interest groups over land use and 
development in different ways. These have included vacant landowners versus neighboring 
owners of developed land (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013); homeowners versus developers 
(Been, Madar, and McDonnell 2014); the median voter and farmers versus developers (Chanel, 
Delattre, and Napoléone 2014); homeowners and environmental groups versus developers 
(Hawkins 2014); and voters versus non-voting interest groups (Schone, Koch, and Baumont 
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2011). All of the studies above, with the exception of Been et al. (2014), took a cross-sectional 
view of zoning and development.  
Homeowners and neighborhood associations are powerful interests in most cities, with an 
apparent economic rationale for opposing upzoning. Fischel (2004) argued that exclusionary 
regulations represent the “dominance of home-owners and their touchiness about their main 
asset” (p. 317). Existing homeowners have an incentive to protect the value of their homes, and 
they do not internalize the price increases for renters or future residents (Glaeser, Gyourko, and 
Saks 2005). A home’s value can be “reduced by changes in nearby land use, increases in 
neighborhood traffic, increases in local taxes, and decreases in the local school’s test scores” 
(Fischel 2005b, 400). Thus, the tendency for homeowners to become involved in local land uses 
issues. Although Fischel (Fischel 2005b; Fischel 2005a) mainly focused on suburban 
homeowners, scholars have applied his model to test homeowner influence in big cities like New 
York City and Los Angeles (Been, Madar, and McDonnell 2014; A. H. Whittemore 2012).  
There has been little research on the determinants of zoning change. In the most relevant 
research on this topic, Been et al. (2014) assessed four aspects of the “growth machine” and 
“homevoter” theories in New York City: the presence and quality of public services, including 
schools, parks and transit; neighborhood market growth; neighborhood demographics, and voter 
turnout. The growth machine motivations were measured in terms of accessibility and amenities 
variables, while the homevoter motivations were measured in terms of homeownership rates. The 
authors used multinomial logistic regression models and found that neighborhood 
homeownership rates were associated with a higher probability of a parcel being downzoned and 
a lower probability of a parcel being upzoned. However, other relationships, including those 
related to city infrastructure capacity, were more ambiguous.  
 8 
 
Neighborhood change, gentrification, and zoning 
Neighborhoods change over time as a “result of past and current flows of households and 
resources— financial, social-psychological and time […]” (Galster 2001, 2121). Some 
neighborhoods experience periods of decline with others go through ascent or gentrification (Zuk 
et al. 2015). There are several reasons to expect links between neighborhood changes and zoning 
decisions. Neighborhoods in the midst of demographic shifts and/or investments in the built 
environment could be more likely to be subsequently upzoned, particularly if they align with 
housing demand drivers. Meanwhile, zoning changes that encourage large new developments 
may then accelerate the pace of neighborhood change. To measure gentrification, scholars have 
focused on housing prices, indicators of neighborhood investment or disinvestment, changes in 
the share of renters, socioeconomic and demographic changes, and measures of neighborhood 
investment potential (Zuk et al. 2015).  
Race and economic status may influence the zoning changes that are proposed for a 
neighborhood, and local residents’ abilities to repel or shape these changes. That is, low-income 
communities and community of color may have less power to influence zoning outcomes (Dubin 
1992). Relatedly, Rabin (1990) proposes the concept of “expulsive zoning,” meaning that cities 
are more likely to adopt incompatible zoning changes (e.g., rezone to allow non-residential uses 
near housing) in black neighborhoods, and these changes ultimately undermine the stability of 
local communities.  
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Fiscal and environmental policy motivations 
Large central cities’ motivations for adopting more permissive zoning requirements 
might include mitigating negative externalities from growth, increasing tax revenue, and 
reducing public service costs. Proponents of upzoning in transit-accessible areas argue that 
residential infill development will result in higher public transit ridership, less road congestion, 
better air quality, and fewer greenhouse gas emissions (Cervero 2004; Landis et al. 2006). This is 
the basis for California’s statewide climate change mitigation policies focused on increasing 
residential densities near frequent-service public transit (Barbour and Deakin 2012).  
Municipal land use decision-making intended to generate property and/or sales tax 
revenues in excess of service costs has been characterized as the “fiscalization of land use” 
(Misczynski 1986; Wassmer 2002; Lewis 2001). This has been particularly prominent in 
California, as 1978 voter-approved property tax limitations have increased municipalities’ 
reliance on sales tax revenue (Lewis 2001; Schwartz 1997). It is unclear if residential density is 
the connection between urban form and public service costs. Some scholars have found higher 
densities to be associated with lower per capita costs for some services (Carruthers and Úlfarsson 
2008; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003), while others have found positive or non-linear 
relationships (Ladd 1992; Ladd 1994).  
 
Los Angeles as a case study 
Planners and economists have gravitated toward studying land use regulations in 
California because of the state’s size, growth rates, degree of metropolitan fragmentation, variety 
of regulations, and general regulatory restrictiveness. I study Los Angeles, California – the most 
populous city in America’s most populous state – to contribute to our limited understanding of 
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intra-city zoning variation, and to add to the small quantitative evidence base related to zoning 
and zoning changes.  
Los Angeles has nearly 3.9 million residents spread across 469 square miles (United 
States Census Bureau 2013). It is a growing city within an expanding metropolitan region; by 
2035, Los Angeles is projected to have 4.3 million residents (Southern California Association of 
Governments 2012). The city has residents and neighborhoods ranging from impoverished to 
some of the wealthiest in the world. While Los Angeles is sometimes portrayed as a city of 
sprawling suburban single-family housing (Ewing 1997), only about 38% of its housing units are 
detached single-family, and 64% of households rent their housing (United States Census Bureau 
2013). 
Land use regulations and residential growth politics have been highly contentious in the 
city of Los Angeles and its larger metropolitan area (Fulton 2001; Morrow 2013; A. H. 
Whittemore 2012). A well-known national regulatory survey, the Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index, found the city of Los Angeles to be more than two standard deviations above 
the national mean on a measure of local political pressure related to development (Gyourko, 
Saiz, and Summers 2008). This is consistent with other municipalities in California, where strong 
local control of zoning represents “the most extreme example of autarky in land-use regulations 
of any U.S. state” (Quigley and Raphael 2005, 323). In California – unlike many states – 
rezonings and general plan amendments tend to go hand-in-hand because state law requires most 
jurisdictions’ zoning to be consistent with the adopted general plan (Governor’s Office of 
Planning and Research 2003). Additionally, California’s environmental regulations – most 
notably the California Environmental Quality Act – are tightly interlaced with these land use 
regulations (Fulton 2005). 
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Several scholars have examined homeowners’ and real estate interests’ involvement in 
Los Angeles’s zoning issues. Morrow (2013), focusing on 1965 to 1992, wrote that city of Los 
Angeles “communities with time, money, and resources (including social capital) can resist 
change while those unable to mobilize bear the burden of future growth” (p. 4). The city of Los 
Angeles has undergone several political regimes with different balances of homeowner and 
developer power, and today’s local land use policy is dominated by “suburban anti-growth 
interests” (A. H. Whittemore 2012, 404). There is some consensus that the historical Southern 
California “growth machine” has been weakened, and single-family homeowners now have the 
upper hand (Fulton 2001; Purcell 2000; A. Whittemore 2010). 
In this paper, I study Los Angeles zoning from 2002 to 2014. This period best matches 
the available zoning data with the city’s modest post-2000 upzoning trend (Morrow 2013). This 
upzoning occurred after significant downzoning between 1960 and 1990 and relative zoning 
stasis between 1990 and 2000 (Morrow 2013; A. H. Whittemore 2012). As to whether my study 
period is “typical,” history shows that planning and rezoning are often geographically and 
temporally lumpy, dependent on market and political conditions. But, it seems reasonable to 
expect Los Angeles’s overall upzoning trend to continue given the metropolitan area’s economic 
growth and housing affordability issues.  
 
Data  
To analyze the determinants of municipal upzoning, I create a detailed dataset of site, 
regulatory, and neighborhood characteristics for the approximately 780,000 parcels located in the 
city of Los Angeles (Los Angeles County Assessor 2012). These data are summarized in Table 
1. 
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Regulations 
Regulatory data are from the city of Los Angeles. The city’s 2002 zoning data, the oldest 
available digitally, provide the baseline for this analysis. The 2014 zoning data, the most recent 
available at the time of writing, represent the other bookend. I use ArcGIS software to spatially 
join the geographic centroids of each parcel to its basic zoning attributes in 2002 and 2014. 
Using centroids standardizes locations over my study period since parcels can be split or 
combined over time.  
Then, for each zoning class in the city – 65 zoning classes in 2002 and 85 in 2014 – I 
calculate the maximum allowable residential density based on the minimum lot size per 
residential unit defined in the municipal code and adopted specific plans (City of Los Angeles 
2015b). For example, in the R3 (multiple dwelling residential) zone, the minimum lot size is 800 
square feet per unit, or about 54 dwelling units per acre. I then calculate each parcel’s maximum 
residential “capacity” in 2002 and 2014 by multiplying the parcel’s lot size by its allowable 
residential density.1 I assign an indicator variable representing where residential capacity 
increased – these are upzoned parcels (Figure 1).2 I note that the indicator variable only 
represents successful upzoning, not proposed rezonings that were not approved, as I discuss later. 
Other planning and regulatory attributes include a location in an Adaptive Reuse Ordinance area, 
Historic Preservation Overlay Zone, and the age of each parcel’s local community plan. 
 
 
[Insert figure 1 here.] 
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Figure 1. Upzoned parcels in Los Angeles (2002-2014). Note: for formatting purposes, map excludes Los Angeles’s 
southern “tail.” 
 
Housing and demographic characteristics 
Most neighborhood characteristic and demographic variables are from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (United States Census Bureau 2000). For the homeownership measure, I assign each tract 
to one of three ordered categories: low for tracts in the bottom quartile of the city’s 
neighborhoods, medium for tracts in the middle two quartiles, and high for tracts in the top 
quartile. For race and ethnicity, I create the same categories for each tract’s black and Hispanic 
population shares. To measure neighborhood change prior to my study period, I calculate 1990-
2000 tract-level changes in total housing units and median gross rent. I use the Longitudinal 
Tract Database crosswalk to reconcile boundary differences between 1990, 2000, and 2012 
Census geographies (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014). 
 
Infrastructure and public services 
Infrastructure and public services variables relate to rail transit and bus rapid transit 
(BRT), parks and open space, and school performance. First, I create an indicator variable 
representing if a parcel is within a half mile of a rail transit or BRT station (Center for Transit-
Oriented Development 2011). For parks and open space, I use city land use data (Los Angeles 
City Planning Department 2014) to calculate the Euclidean distance from each parcel to the 
nearest park of at least a quarter acre. For school quality, I focus on elementary school 
standardized test scores, as measured by California’s Academic Performance Index (API) 2013 
Growth data (California Department of Education 2015). Given that open enrollment policies 
mean that nearly one-third of Los Angeles’s children attend schools outside their attendance 
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zone (Ledwith 2010), I create an inverse distance-weighted measure, with the scores of schools 
closest to each parcel weighted more than schools farther away.  
 
Other measures of accessibility, amenities, and natural features 
Other data relate to employment density, job accessibility, proximity to the nearest 
freeway ramp, proximity to the ocean, elevation, and slope. Employment density is calculated 
from 2000 Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) tract-level data (United States 
Department of Transportation 2000). The employment accessibility measure is from Lens (2014) 
based on 2000 CTPP data (United States Department of Transportation 2000). The Euclidean 
distance from each parcel to the nearest freeway ramp is calculated using CalTrans Enhanced 
National Highway System data (California Department of Transportation 2013). The Euclidean 
distance from each parcel to the ocean is calculated using USGS California shoreline data 
(Hapke, Reid, and Borrelli 2008). The elevation of each parcel centroid is calculated using the 
USGS ten foot digital elevation model for Los Angeles County (United States Geological Survey 
2006). Lastly, the slope in degrees of every parcel is calculated using the USGS digital elevation 
model and ArcGIS Slope tool (Esri 2011; United States Geological Survey 2006). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 
 
 
Methods 
My conceptual model is that parcel upzoning is a function of housing demand and supply 
factors, the influence of local homeowners, municipal fiscal policy goals, socioeconomic and 
demographic factors, and neighborhood housing trends. In general, demand factors and 
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municipal policy objectives would be expected to lead to upzoning. Strong homeowner interests, 
in contrast, would most likely hinder upzoning proposals.  
 
Logistic regression models 
Logistic regression models are appropriate for analyzing relationships between a binary 
dependent variable and a set of covariates (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). I specify 
logistic regression models in the general form of Equation 1. The dependent variable is a binary 
measure of whether a parcel was upzoned between 2002 and 2014. Predictors relate to amenities, 
accessibility, natural features, land use regulations, infrastructure, population and employment 
density, median household income, neighborhood demographics, and neighborhood changes. I 
include City Council district fixed effects to control for unobservable within-city variation 
related to geographic and political factors. I cluster standard errors by Census tract to account for 
dependence between nearby observations. 
 
Equation 1. Logistic regression model of parcel upzoning 𝑈𝑝𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔! =  𝛼 +  𝛽!𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! +  𝛽!𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!  +  𝛽!𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙! +  𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! +  𝛽!𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙!+  𝛽!𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟!  +   𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠! +  𝛽!𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! +  𝛽!𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙!+  𝜀! 
 
I specify separate models for parcels initially zoned for single-family housing (“SF” 
parcels) and those that were not (“non-SF” parcels).3 I split these two types of parcels because 
the literature and Los Angeles-specific policies indicate different decision processes given strong 
single-family neighborhood protections in local policy.  
Logistic regression results are commonly reported as the natural log of odds (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). To aid in interpretation I report odds ratios. The odds ratios in 
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this paper represent the odds of a parcel being upzoning compared with the odds of a parcel not 
being upzoned. Statistically significant values greater than one show that as the predictor 
variable increases, so do the odds of a parcel being upzoned. Values lower than one show that as 
a predictor increases, the odds of upzoning decrease. 
 
Negative binomial regression model 
Although this paper is focused on a binary upzoning outcome, as a robustness check I 
model the determinants of new residential development capacity added through upzoning. Here 
instead of a binary outcome, the dependent variable is a count of a parcel’s additional residential 
development capacity from upzoning. I estimate that the city added zoning capacity for a 
maximum of 116,000 new units on the parcels that were upzoned (Gabbe 2016). I mostly focus 
on the logit model results for two reasons. First, this paper is focused on what makes upzoned 
parcels different from other parcels. Second, the upzoned development capacity estimate does 
not take into account site-specific development limitations, so I view it as a rough 
approximation. 
The most commonly used regression models for count data are Poisson and negative 
binomial (Hilbe 2014). The statistically significant likelihood ratio test indicates that a negative 
binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson model (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 
2016). I specify negative binomial models for SF and non-SF parcels in the general form of 
Equation 2. The single-family parcel model failed to converge – because few single-family 
parcels were upzoned, and the counts of new development capacity are low – and I thus only 
report the results from the non-SF model.  
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Equation 2. Negative binomial regression model of new residential development capacity through upzoning 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!=  𝛼 +  𝛽!𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! +  𝛽!𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!  +  𝛽!𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙! +  𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! +  𝛽!𝑀𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙!+  𝛽!𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟!  +   𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠! +  𝛽!𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! +  𝛽!𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙!+  𝜀! 
 
Addressing the endogeneity of zoning and housing markets 
Endogeneity is a methodological issue in most of the literature on land use regulations 
and housing markets (Quigley and Rosenthal 2005). At issue is the simultaneity of influences; 
neighborhood characteristics affect zoning, and zoning affects neighborhood characteristics 
(Pogodzinski and Sass 1994; Quigley and Rosenthal 2005). I address endogeneity in two ways in 
both models. First, I incorporate a dependent variable that represents zoning change, rather than 
cross-sectional characteristic of zoning. Second, given that zoning decisions are related to 
existing land uses and demographics, I control for each parcel’s baseline characteristics. 
 
Results and discussion 
Upzoning was relatively rare in Los Angeles, with about 1.1% of the city’s land area 
upzoned in the twelve-year study period. Below, Table 2 summarizes the regression results from 
the citywide models. The non-single-family model fits better than the single-family model. The 
McFadden’s R-squared statistic for the non-SF model was 0.39 compared with 0.17 for the 
single-family model. Many of the upzoned single-family parcels were in the San Fernando 
Valley, and it was more difficult to predict where these would be located.  
The parcels with the highest likelihood of being upzoned were near downtown or at the 
urban fringe, zoned for employment uses (e.g., industrial, warehousing, etc.), and in 
neighborhoods with rising rents. Upzoning was less likely in neighborhoods with higher shares 
of homeowners, nearer to the beach, and in neighborhoods with higher standardized test scores. 
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At the end of this section, I compare these results with the determinants of new housing capacity 
(the negative binomial model).  
 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 
Accessibility 
There are no significant associations between freeway access, rail and BRT proximity or 
employment accessibility and the odds of a parcel being upzoned. In terms of transit – a high 
profile driver of planning – there are several other reasons why Los Angeles’s increasing transit-
orientation is not indicated in the regression results. One is that the city’s rail and BRT lines run 
through some areas that already had permissive zoning, including downtown Los Angeles. 
Another is that some upzoning around stations was approved prior to 2002, such as the 
Vermont/Western specific plan for four stations (City of Los Angeles 2001). Additionally, some 
transit-oriented policy initiatives were either recently adopted or are still tentative, including the 
draft transit neighborhood plans around ten rail stations (City of Los Angeles 2013a; Los 
Angeles Department of City Planning 2015). Lastly, the Hollywood Community Plan – a major 
plan to densify near rail transit – was halted by a lawsuit and is currently being revised (Zahniser 
2013). It is reasonable to expect different results if this study was repeated in five or ten years.  
 
Amenities 
Parcels nearer to the beach and higher performing elementary schools are generally 
associated with lower odds of upzoning. For non-SF parcels, for every mile farther from the 
beach, the odds of a parcel being upzoned increase by 56%. For single-family parcels, there is no 
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significant association. School performance is associated with lower odds of upzoning non-SF 
parcels. For every one hundred-point increase in neighborhood API score, the odds of a non-SF 
parcel being upzoned decrease by 11%. There is no significant association between school 
performance and single-family parcel upzoning.  
In terms of open space, there is no significant association citywide between proximity to 
a park and upzoning. General park proximity may be so common that it is not a major driver of 
demand. Over 80% of parcels in the city are within a half-mile of a moderately sized park. 
Lastly, there are no significant associations between elevation and upzoning.  
 
Steep slopes 
There is no significant association between steep slopes and upzoning for non-SF parcels. 
However, somewhat surprisingly, single-family parcels on steep slopes have nearly three times 
higher odds of being upzoned. This may be because 25% slopes may not represent a major 
development constraint; steep slopes may represent a view, which drives demand and increases 
the likelihood of upzoning; and/or single-family sites with steep slopes may have been 
historically overlooked and are now being viewed as a building opportunity.  
 
Regulations and lot characteristics 
A handful of pre-existing regulatory characteristics affect whether a parcel was upzoned. 
First, historic preservation overlay zones (HPOZ) effectively stop zoning changes. A non-SF 
parcel located in a HPOZ is associated with 96% lower odds of upzoning. There were only about 
a dozen such HPOZ parcels modestly upzoned between residential categories. There were no 
single-family parcels in HPOZs upzoned between 2002 and 2014.  
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Zoning designations in place in 2002 affect subsequent upzoning. Overall, lower-
intensity parcels are more likely to be upzoned than higher intensity ones. Parcels zoned for 
parking, manufacturing, and agricultural uses are much more likely to be upzoned than 
multifamily or commercial zoned parcels. Relatedly, parcels where allowable densities exceed 
100 dwelling units per acre are unlikely to be further upzoned, demonstrating the ceiling to the 
city’s baseline allowable density. Additionally, there is no significant relationship between a 
parcel being located in an adaptive reuse ordinance (ARO) area and being upzoned. These areas 
already tend to have permissive density allowances, which limits the extent to which there is 
further upzoning. 
Lastly, I analyze the relationship between community plan updates and zoning decisions. 
Community plans are the city’s district-level plans to implement the citywide general plan (City 
of Los Angeles 2015a). For non-SF parcels, for every year since a community plan was last 
updated, there are about 16% lower odds of a parcel being upzoned. This supports the idea that 
zoning is an implementation tool of planning, and upzoning is more likely with prior planning. 
There is no significant association between plan age and upzoning in single-family 
neighborhoods. Lastly, I looked at lot size. For non-SF parcels, there is no significant 
relationship between lot size and the likelihood of upzoning a parcel. One reason is that large-
scale city-initiated upzonings, like specific plans, include parcels of a variety of sizes. For SF 
parcels, there is a small positive relationship between parcel size and upzoning. This shows that 
larger parcels, including agricultural parcels, are more likely to be rezoned than smaller single-
family lots. 
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Homeowner interests 
The results from both models support the homevoter hypothesis. A parcel in a 
neighborhood with a higher share of homeowners is much less likely to be upzoned. This holds 
true for both non-SF and single-family parcels, and is the most consistent result across both sets 
of models. For non-SF parcels, the odds of upzoning in an area with a medium homeownership 
share (middle two quartiles) are about 82% lower than one in a neighborhood with a low 
homeownership share (bottom quartile). The odds of upzoning a non-SF parcel in a high 
ownership neighborhood (top quartile) are about 96% lower than in a low ownership 
neighborhood. For single-family parcels, the odds lower by 82% and 93% respectively. 
 
Population and employment density 
There were mixed results in terms of population density and upzoning. Non-SF parcels in 
neighborhoods with higher population density were more likely to be upzoned. This illustrates 
development pressures in urbanized areas. Meanwhile, SF parcels in lower density areas are 
more likely to be upzoned. This is reasonable since many of the upzoned single-family parcels 
were originally zoned for agricultural uses, and located at the edge of the city. Citywide, there 
are no significant associations between employment density and the odds of upzoning a parcel.  
 
Neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic factors 
I include measures of median household income, black population share, and Hispanic 
population share. I find no significant relationships between these variables and the odds of 
upzoning. From the descriptive statistics we might expect there to be differences for black and 
Hispanic neighborhoods. For example, 22% of parcels are in neighborhoods with more than 7% 
black population share (neighborhoods in the top quartile), while 16% of upzoned parcels were 
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in these neighborhoods. However, after controlling for other factors, these differences were not 
statistically significant. Further research is certainly needed to better understand how 
communities of color influence, and are influenced by, zoning changes. In particular, it would be 
important to focus on neighborhoods with the largest and/or fastest-changing shares of residents 
who are black or Hispanic. 
 
Neighborhood change 
I hypothesize that market trends from 1990-2000 (e.g., new housing development and 
rising rents) could lead to more upzoning during the 2002-14 period. I find mixed results. There 
is no significant relationship between changes to the number of housing units in a neighborhood 
between 1990 and 2000 and the likelihood of a parcel being upzoned. This may be because 
housing growth occurred in areas with existing development capacity, so no further upzoning 
was necessary.  
However, non-SF parcels in neighborhoods with faster-rising rents are more likely to be 
upzoned. For every one hundred dollars that a tract’s median rent increases between 1990 and 
2000 (in nominal dollars), the odds of a non-SF parcel being upzoned increase by 74%. This 
illustrates real estate developer interests in the rezoning process. However, on single-family 
parcels, rising rents decrease the likelihood of a parcel being upzoned; for every one hundred 
dollar increase, the odds decrease by about 27%. This is because upzoned SF parcels are mostly 
located in the suburban San Fernando Valley, where the rental market was weaker. A useful 
future extension of this research would examine what was built on these parcels (if anything) 
after the upzonings were approved. 
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Comparing the determinants of upzoning and new development capacity 
Although the focus of this paper is explaining why some lots are upzoned rather than 
others, as a robustness check I examine the determinants of new residential development 
capacity. The results are largely similar (table not shown). Consistent with the logit upzoning 
model, Los Angeles’s new residential capacity is likely to be further from the beach, in 
neighborhoods with lower school test scores, on sites that did not previously allow residential 
development, in areas with newer community plans, and in neighborhoods with fewer 
homeowners. 
There are three main differences. First, the city is more likely to add new development 
capacity by upzoning parcels nearer to freeways. This highlights the continued value placed on 
auto accessibility in Los Angeles. Second, capacity is more likely to be added in lower elevation 
areas, which are the most urbanized parts of the city. Third, this model shows no significant 
relationship between the degree of upzoning and rising rents in the 1990-2000 period. One 
explanation is that some of the biggest upzonings were initiated by the city through specific 
plans, and these initiatives were based less on market factors than on other policy priorities. 
Overall, despite these differences, both sets of modeling results suggest the same basic story 
about upzoning. 
 
Opportunities for future research 
The limitations of this study suggest opportunities for future scholarship. First, future 
research would ideally assess three possible zoning outcomes: no zoning change, upzoning 
approved, and upzoning denied. That is, we could analyze the characteristics of unsuccessful 
upzoning proposals; unfortunately zone change denial data are not available in a systematic form 
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for Los Angeles. As a result, this paper may underestimate the influence of the determinants by 
essentially combining parcels with no zoning change and upzoning denied. This is probably a 
minor issue in this case. Anecdotally, from talking with several local planners and developers, I 
learned that developers in Los Angeles try to avoid entering unpredictable discretionary 
processes, including proposing zoning changes that they think are likely to be denied. This points 
to another gap for future research: better understanding how developers’ prior knowledge of 
what is likely to be approved influences their decisions about whether to propose an upzoning in 
the first place.  
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This research finds that homeowners – and especially those with access to valuable 
amenities – are associated with regulatory stasis. The current political dynamic in Los Angeles, 
and undoubtedly many other American cities, is one in which the most desirable areas are also 
the most difficult to upzone. This presents a major barrier to using infill development to focus 
urban growth, as envisioned by local, regional, and state policymakers.  
We need to better understand why and how some urban interests oppose growth. For 
instance, if a small vocal minority of homeowners can successfully fight zoning change, it is 
entirely possible for neighborhoods with moderate or low homeownership rates to successfully 
oppose growth. Additionally, there may be opposition from commercial property owners or other 
stakeholders. A good example is Hollywood, where a small group of litigious local property 
owners has fought zoning change and new development.  
My findings suggest that there is some relatively “low hanging fruit” for rezonings and 
new development. Upzoning is most likely on sites with lower-intensity land uses, like parking, 
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agriculture, and manufacturing. This is consistent with basic economic theory about the 
transition of land uses to the highest and best use in a growing city. Upzoning these types of 
parcels usually represents a sizable increase in allowable density. Parking, agriculture, and 
manufacturing parcels also tend to be located nearer fewer residents (and homeowners). This 
helps explain how upzoning takes the path of least resistance in terms of proximity to existing 
residents. But, this could be problematic over the long-term, because there is a limited supply of 
such land in higher-demand locations, and redevelopment for residential uses may have adverse 
impacts on local employment. 
To overcome conflicts over zoning, planners will need to tailor neighborhood and 
citywide solutions to increase density. If local residents are concerned about protecting their 
access to amenities and existing neighborhood character, planners can partially mitigate these 
concerns through clearly written and predictably applied urban design standards, and linking new 
development with public improvements. Additionally, some consistent citywide policy changes 
may be more politically feasible than piecemeal neighborhood-scale policy changes. For 
example, the city could systematically reduce minimum parking standards near transit stations 
(rather than selectively in certain station areas). Lastly, when restrictive regulations hinder 
regional housing needs – particularly near transit – state intervention to allow higher densities 
should be a last resort. In short, upzoning will take a nuanced approach at the neighborhood and 
citywide scales. 
 
  
 26 
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of parcel variables 
 
Non-single-family parcels Single-family/residential estate/agricultural parcels 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Distance to freeway ramp 
(miles) 350,866 0.82 0.70 437,472 1.12 0.85 
Employment accessibility 
measure (2000) 350,866 617.31 190.36 437,472 473.27 177.67 
Within a half mile of a rail 
or BRT station (indicator) 350,866 0.19 0.39 437,472 0.06 0.23 
Distance to beach (miles) 350,866 10.23 4.42 437,472 11.36 4.97 
Neighborhood API score 350,866 80.79 5.32 437,472 83.08 5.64 
Distance to quarter-acre park 
(miles) 350,866 0.29 0.22 437,472 0.31 0.24 
Elevation (in 100s of feet) 350,866 3.91 3.27 437,472 6.80 4.00 
Slope above 25% (indicator) 350,866 0.15 0.36 437,472 0.21 0.41 
Lot size (acres) 350,866 1.21 7.21 437,472 0.32 2.64 
Historic Preservation 
Overlay Zone (2002, 
indicator) 350,866 0.02 0.13 437,472 0.01 0.08 
Residential development 
allowed (2002, indicator) 350,866 0.90 0.30 437,472 1.00 0.00 
Over 100 units/acre allowed 
(2002, indicator) 350,866 0.20 0.40 437,472 0.00 0.00 
Adaptive Reuse Ordinance 
area (2002) 350,866 1.06 0.23 437,472 1.00 0.01 
Years since last Community 
Plan update (based on 2014) 350,865 15.18 3.40 437,471 16.08 2.90 
Population density (2000, in 
1000s of persons/sq. mi.) 350,705 13.37 10.24 435,827 7.05 4.73 
Employment density (2000, 
in 1000s of jobs/sq. mi.) 350,866 7.30 14.70 437,472 2.31 3.68 
Share owner-occupied 
housing units (2000) 350,705 0.34 0.21 435,827 0.63 0.21 
Median household income 
(2000, in 1000s of $US) 350,705 38.19 19.70 435,827 60.43 31.25 
Share black (2000)  350,705 0.12 0.16 435,827 0.09 0.17 
Share Hispanic (2000) 350,705 0.44 0.28 435,827 0.31 0.26 
Change in tract housing 
units (1990-2000, in 100s of 
units) 350,705 0.45 2.46 435,827 0.32 1.83 
Change in tract median gross 
rent (1990-2000, in 100s of 
nominal $) 350,705 1.14 1.33 435,827 2.18 2.73 
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Table 2. Logistic regression results for upzoning (odds ratios) 
  (1) (2) 
 
Non-SF 
Parcels SF Parcels 
VARIABLES Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
      
Distance to freeway ramp (miles) 0.651 0.952 
 
(0.181) (0.146) 
Employment accessibility measure (2000) 0.997 0.997 
 
(0.00459) (0.00319) 
Within a half mile of a rail or BRT station (indicator) 0.656 0.937 
 
(0.238) (0.338) 
Distance to beach (miles) 1.563*** 1.139 
 
(0.171) (0.113) 
Neighborhood API score 0.888* 1.049 
 
(0.0411) (0.0536) 
Distance to quarter-acre park (miles) 0.871 0.503 
 
(0.855) (0.305) 
Elevation (in 100s of feet) 0.683 0.869 
 
(0.151) (0.0625) 
Slope above 25% (indicator) 1.275 2.929*** 
 
(0.637) (0.794) 
Lot size (acres) 0.990 1.016** 
 
(0.0138) (0.00510) 
Historic Preservation Overlay Zone (2002, indicator)) 0.0377*** 
 
 
(0.0260) 
 Residential development allowed (2002, indicator) 0.136*** 
 
 
(0.0637) 
 Over 100 units/acre allowed (2002, indicator) 0.00558*** 
 
 
(0.00680) 
 Adaptive Reuse Ordinance area (2002) 2.953 
 
 
(2.124) 
 Years since last Community Plan update (based on 2014) 0.840*** 1.022 
 
(0.0379) (0.0570) 
Population density (2000, in 1000s of persons/sq. mi.) 1.045* 0.897** 
 
(0.0201) (0.0318) 
Employment density (2000, in 1000s of jobs/sq. mi.) 0.971 0.981 
 
(0.0308) (0.0492) 
Medium homeownship vs. low homeownership tract 0.180** 0.175*** 
 
(0.112) (0.0889) 
High homeownership vs. low homeownership tract 0.0417*** 0.0646*** 
 
(0.0395) (0.0378) 
Median household income (2000, in 1000s of $US) 1.024 1.008 
 
(0.0213) (0.0118) 
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Medium black share tract vs. low black share tract 1.502 0.872 
 
(0.742) (0.261) 
High black share tract vs. low black share tract 0.185 1.243 
 
(0.176) (0.682) 
Medium Hispanic share tract vs. low black share tract 0.929 1.338 
 
(0.378) (0.480) 
High Hispanic share tract vs. low black share tract 0.340 1.197 
 
(0.207) (0.778) 
Change in tract housing units (1990-2000, in 100s of units) 1.032 0.925 
 
(0.116) (0.0438) 
Change in tract median gross rent (1990-2000, in 100s of 
nominal $) 1.735*** 0.731** 
 
(0.256) (0.0852) 
   Observations 350,688 431,198 
City Council District FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
   
Note: for SF model, missing variables predict the results perfectly or were perfectly collinear. 
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Endnotes 
                                                
1 In 1986, Los Angeles voters approved Proposition U, which limited development in 
commercial zones to a floor area ratio of 1.5 across much of the city (City of Los Angeles 
2013b). High housing densities would be difficult or impossible to develop in affected zones, 
except perhaps in buildings composed of small studio apartments. However, since my primary 
focus here is on changes to regulations, I retain the base dwelling per acre estimates to compare 
2002 and 2014 regulations.  
2 I estimate that 60% of Los Angeles’s upzonings were initiated by property owners, 
while 40% were the result of new city-initiated plans. 
3 Single-family parcels include parcels zoned for agricultural uses (A1 and A2 zoning 
designations) because these zones allow detached dwellings.	
